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Introduction
Corporate governance experts typically delineate between insiders and outside investors when characterizing a firm's corporate control structure (e.g., Becker et al. (2011) , Clifford and Lindsey (2016) ). Insiders have access to private internal information and exert direct control over decisions within the firm. Outside investors lack access to internal information and must rely on the firm's corporate governance levers to exercise control. This binary taxonomy is natural, as it reflects the typical separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation.
However, it masks the presence of agents in the control structure who have some characteristics of insiders but do not exercise formal control. These "quasi-insiders," who operate at the periphery of control, include founders and former executives who may still have both access to inside information and influence as a result of their connections within the firm. They also include non-executive directors, who rarely exert control directly over corporate decisions but have access to information and may be able to use governance structures, including board actions, to induce change. 1 Because of their informational advantage and ability to influence decision-making, quasi-insiders have the potential to play a significant role in the corporate governance process. They may play an especially important role in smaller firms, where the potential dollar returns to engaging in activism are often too small to attract the attention of activist hedge fund. The presence of quasi-insiders, even when passive, may influence decision-making by insiders because of the threat of governance action. This influence may be positive, if the threat of action spurs insiders to act in shareholders' best interest. It can also be negative, as managers may distort their decisions in response to having well-informed, potentially-activist quasi-insiders continuously "staring over their shoulders."
They may also increase opacity in order to limit the availability of information that quasi-insiders might use to publicly question management's decisions and/or performance. This paper takes a first step towards understanding the role of quasi-insiders in corporate governance by studying activist campaigns that they initiate. We begin by characterizing these activists, the firms they target, their objectives, and the tactics they employ, using activist hedge funds as a benchmark (e.g. Klein and Zur (2009) ). The majority of our sample of quasi-insiders consists of founders, former CEOs, and former board chairs.
Unlike hedge fund activists, who often buy stakes in firms with the intent of launching activism campaigns, these quasi-insiders often already hold stakes in the firms they target.
Compared to firms that activist hedge funds target, firms in which quasi-insiders initiate activism campaigns tend to be smaller and have less institutional ownership. Fixed costs of initiating campaigns may dissuade hedge funds from targeting smaller companies, and hedge funds generally prefer to target firms with high institutional ownership. These findings, then, support the argument that quasi-insiders play a complementary role to hedge fund activists by exerting pressure on firms that hedge fund activists are likely to ignore. However, accounting and stock return performance tends to have deteriorated substantially more at firms targeted by quasi-insiders by the time they are targeted than at firms targeted by hedge funds, suggesting that the threshold level of deterioration for intervention is greater for the types of firms that quasi-insiders target.
Quasi-insiders are much more likely to seek some degree of control when they embark on activism campaigns rather than just inducing one-time actions, such as dividend payments. They seek at least some board representation in 65.6% of the campaigns they undertake, compared to 39.8% of hedge fund activism campaigns. They seek outright control of the board 30.5% of the time, compared to only 7.7% for hedge fund activism campaigns.
This tendency to seek control could naturally reflect the fact that quasi-insiders are well-informed about the firm by virtue of their experience as insiders. Theories of the allocation of authority typically suggest that control should be allocated to more informed parties whenever possible (Aghion and Tirole (1997) , Dessein (2002) ). Alternatively, it may reflect egoistic behavior, with quasi-insiders overestimating their informational advantage and skill at directing the firm's activities.
Quasi-insiders also tend to employ more aggressive tactics in their activism campaigns than activist hedge funds. For example, they are considerably more likely to file lawsuits (14.3% of cases, vs. 5.8% for activist hedge funds), nominate directors (55.8%, vs. 26.4%), and write letters to shareholders (46.1%, vs. 15.3%) . Their campaigns are also more likely to involve proxy fights (61.7%, vs. 26.6%). These findings could indicate that quasi-insiders are less concerned about trying to cooperate with the firms they own than activist hedge funds, who try to induce changes in many firms over time.
Next, we examine the consequences of quasi-insider initiated campaigns. Cumulative abnormal returns associated with the announcement of these campaigns are significantly positive but smaller than those for hedge-fund initiated campaigns, on average (4.2%, vs. 6.2% for hedge-fund campaigns). However, campaigns in which the quasi-insider seeks to gain more control, either by winning board seats or by forcing a sale to that individual, are associated with abnormal announcement returns comparable to those of similar campaigns initiated by activist hedge funds ( 6.6% for quasi-insider campaigns and 6.7% for hedge fund campaigns). 2 Consistent with the market's response, we also find evidence of substantial improvements in long-run performance after control-seeking campaigns initiated by quasi-insiders. After declining consistently over the three years leading up to these campaigns, industry-adjusted return on assets increases by five percentage points, on average, between the year of one of these campaign and the year after. This improvement lasts for at least three years. We do not observe such reversals for firms with similar declines in performance that are not subject to activism campaigns. We also do not observe comparable improvements in performance after hedge fund-initiated campaigns, suggesting that detectable improvements in operating metrics are unique to quasi-insider campaigns.
Our focus on quasi-insiders helps to address concerns about interpreting the consequences of activism campaigns. Traditional activists choose which firms to target. Moreover, they often acquire stakes in their targets coincident with launching an activism campaign (Cohn et al. (2016) ). Thus, their actions may convey information about a firm's future prospects, complicating interpretation of campaigns announcement returns and longer-run changes in performance. A quasi-insider, in contrast, can only target a firm with which she has a prior connection, and these investors typically already hold stakes in the companies they target. So, while the decision to target a company is still potentially endogenous, decisions about which company to target and the accumulation of an ownership stake can be treated as exogenous.
Finally, we examine the likelihood that quasi-insider activists achieve the stated objectives of their campaigns.
They are significantly less likely than hedge-fund initiated campaigns to successfully achieve their objectives. This relative lack of success could reflect the fact that their objectives tend to be more ambitious, on average, than those of hedge fund activists. The market may also view these campaigns with more suspicion, as these campaigns 2 The quasi-insider seeks board representation in 52 of these campaigns, board control in 46, and a sale to herself in eight. are more likely than hedge fund campaigns to be motivated by the activist's ego, given quasi-insiders' history with the firm. Quasi-insiders may also simply have a lower bar for initiating campaigns if a relative informational advantage makes the cost of undertaking a campaign low.
Overall, our results suggest a previously-unexplored mode of activist governance that appears relevant in the types of firms that activist hedge funds are naturally less inclined to target in activist campaigns. These quasiinsider activists appear to be more aggressive in their campaigns than activist hedge funds and to be effective in inducing improvements in value and profitability. Further analysis of the implications of having quasi-insiders in a firm's ownership structure, even when they are not engaging in activism, would further round out our understanding of the implications of having these agents as governance providers. 3
Our paper contributes to the literature on shareholder activism. Most research in this literature examines activism by arm's-length investors such as hedge funds (e.g. Brav et al. (2008) , Klein and Zur (2009) ) and pension funds (e.g. Carleton et al. (1998) , Gillan and Starks (2000) ). Broader papers often explicitly exclude activists with inside connections from their analysis (Clifford and Lindsey (2016) ) or consider current but insiders but not those with prior relationships (von Lilienfeld-Toal and Schnitzler (2015)). Our results are the first to our knowledge to demonstrate that activism by these quasi-insiders can play a meaningful role in governance, especially in smaller firms that traditional hedge-fund activists are likely to ignore. Thus, they appear to complement the role of more traditional activists such as hedge funds.
Our paper is also related to recent work by von Lilienfeld-Toal and Schnitzler (2015) , who examine announcement returns around all 13D filings from 1985 through 2012, for different types of filers. They find that the identity of the filer is less important than the size of the stake and the complexity of the case (as proxied for by the length of the filing text). Our paper, in contrast, examines actual activism campaign announcements, which often occur either before or several years after the filing of a 13D filing. Moreover, our thorough hand-classification process allows us to go beyond their analysis and shed light on important aspects of the campaign such as the identities of the activists, the characteristics of the targets, the purpose of the campaign, the tactics employed, and the outcome.
If the quasi-insider initiated campaigns we observe materialize only after a series of less confrontational tactics have been attempted (e.g. Gantchev (2013) ), this suggests that insider-led governance efforts are likely to be more frequent and pervasive than we observe. Insider activism may therefore represent the tip of a large iceberg that represents the active involvement of quasi-insiders in corporate governance. Therefore, a broader implication of our paper is to add insider activism to the existing view of corporate governance, which encompasses board monitoring of managers (e.g. Adams et al. (2010) ), compensation incentives (e.g. Jensen and Murphy (1990) ), the market for corporate control (e.g. Jensen and Ruback (1983) ), activist outside investors (e.g. Black (1998) ), and regulation (e.g. Larcker et al. (2011) ).
Shareholder Activism
This section describes the shareholder activism campaign process in general. This discussion can easily be skipped by those already familiar with shareholder activism. It also discusses the potential role of quasi-insiders in activism, the novel element of our paper.
Shareholder Activists and Activism Campaigns
Shareholder activism encompasses a variety of activities that shareholders undertake in an effort to bring about a change in the management, structure, or operations of a firm (see Gillan and Starks (2000) for a thorough discussion). Many of these activities take place behind the scenes, as activists engage with management informally to influence corporate decisions towards their agenda. However, in some cases, activists wage public activism campaigns, often after exhausting attempts to induce change through informal engagement with management.
These public campaigns are typically classified into three types: proxy fights, exempt solicitations, and other stockholder campaigns.
Proxy fights are the most involved and costly mode of shareholder activism. In a proxy fight, the activist (or "dissident") shareholder formally proposes a resolution to be voted upon at the company's annual meeting by filing Schedule 14A with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The dissident then attempts to procure votes in support of its resolution by soliciting the "proxies" of other shareholders (few of whom actually attend the annual meeting in person).
Proxy contests can be classified based on their objective. In a control contest, the dissident shareholder seeks to acquire a majority of seats on the board of directors, which would effectively give the dissident control of the company. In a short-sale contest, the dissident seeks to acquire board seats, but not enough to gain a majority of the director positions. In an issue contest, the dissident seeks to win shareholder approval of a resolution relating to a specific operational or structural issue. Examples of issue contests include those proposing an increase in dividends to shareholders or the curbing of executive compensation. Votes on these issue-related proposals are typically non-binding on management, though they often do lead to change (Ertimur et al. (2010) ). The vast majority of proxy fights are either issue contests or short-sale contests.
In contrast to proxy contests, exempt solicitations and other stockholder campaigns do not involve attempting to pass a formal resolution. An exempt solicitation campaign entails communicating with other shareholders of the company regarding an issue without formally soliciting proxies. Other stockholder campaigns are campaigns in which the dissident does not interact directly with other shareholders. A typical example of other stockholder campaigns includes a press release detailing a letter the activist sent to management with requests for corporate change. This is considered to be a less costly form of activism than a proxy contest, but more expensive than publicly communicating its intent (Wilcox (2011) ).
Many activist campaigns commence with a Schedule 13D filing. An investor is required to file an initial 13D if the investor passes the 5% threshold of beneficial ownership in a publicly listed company and has plans to take an active role. Investors that cross the 5% threshold without any intention of taking an active role can file a shortened Schedule 13G. Activists have an obligation to submit 13D filings within 10 days of crossing the 5% threshold and the form includes details on the class of securities acquired, the identity of the activist blockholder, the source of funds, a description of their intent, the day they crossed the threshold, and the amount of securities they hold.
Hedge funds manage largely unregulated capital, have the ability to hold concentrated positions, can use financial leverage, and employ derivatives in their portfolios. They also face steep financial incentives and are less likely to be beholden to the management of firms. For these reasons, hedge funds are thought to be particularly effective activists compared to other types of investors (Boyson and Mooradian (2011) ). Hedge funds are known to use a sequence of increasingly aggressive and costly tactics to bring about changes at firms they invest in (Gantchev (2013) ). They typically start with a conversation with management, which can escalate to more formal communications via press releases and specific proposals if management is unresponsive. If they remain dissatisfied with the management' response they may initiate a proxy fight, litigation, or in some instances, attempt to take complete control of the company themselves.
Existing research (e.g. Brav et al. (2008) , Klein and Zur (2009), Clifford (2008) , and Greenwood and Schor (2009) ) finds that hedge fund activists propose a wide variety of improvements including strategic, operational, and financial. The targets receive large positive and persistent abnormal announcement returns and acquiesce to requests the majority of the time, altering investment strategies and mitigating cash flow agency concerns.
Quasi-Insider Activism
While institutional investors such as hedge funds launch many activism campaigns, individuals launch such campaigns as well. Some of these campaigns involve individuals with no direct connection to the company.
Corporate "gadflies," for example, typically launch low-cost campaigns at companies more as a sign of protest than as a means of effecting meaningful change. However, individuals who have either a prior or current relationship with the firm are responsible for a substantial number of individual-initiated campaigns and, as we demonstrate, these campaigns tend to be serious endeavors. We refer to any individual who has previously served as an officer or director of the firm, founded the firm, or is a current non-executive director of the firm as a quasi-insider.
These individuals either lack formal authority or, in the case of current non-executive, have limited authority over firm decisions.
We sketch the details of two activism campaigns that quasi-insiders initiated to provide a more detailed sense of what these campaigns entail. The first is a campaign is a campaign at LCA-Vision that three former executives, one of whom was the founder of the company, launched in 2008. Stephen Joffe, founder and former chairman and CEO, Craig Joffe, former interim CEO, and Alan Buckey, former CFO, combined forces to create the LCA-Vision Full Value Committee. On November 5, 2008 they filed a 13D disclosing an ownership stake of 11% and their intent to talk with management about ways to increase shareholder value. They met with the current chairman of the board on November 13 and issued a press release on November 19, unhappy with the fact that management had not responded to their concerns. On November 21, they disclosed that they had sent another letter to management, indicating that they would take any steps necessary to increase shareholder value. The company responded by adopting a 20% poison pill. On December 4, the committee sent another letter requesting board representation and a special shareholder meeting about the poison pill. Management rejected these requests. On December 17, the dissidents threatened a proxy fight, and the company responded by establishing a rule requiring 90-120 days advance notice for a meeting proposal. On January 16, 2009, the dissidents proposed a replacement slate for the board of directors. However, after failing to get support from the proxy advisory service Glass-Lewis Co., they withdrew the slate on March 26.
As another example, Craig Skotdal filed a 13D requesting that the company nominate him and three other individuals to the board of directors at the upcoming meeting. Skotdal was a non-executive director of the company at the time. He owned 6.4% of the company's shares personally, and the four nominees combined owned 11.5% of shares outstanding. The board consisted of 12 total seats, but only four seats (including Skotdal's) were up for election in 2010. On April 29, 2010, the dissidents agreed to remove their alternative slate and support management's nominations. In exchange, the company agreed to expand the board from 12 to 15 and include the three members of the group who were not already members of the board.
Data and Sample
This section describes the data that we use in our empirical analysis. We obtain all activist campaigns from FactSet's SharkWatch corporate activism database announced between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2015
for which we are able to obtain data on the total assets and book-to-market of target firms from Compustat. 4 We identify 1,962 activist campaigns that hedge funds initiate. This sample of campaigns overlaps with samples that previous papers focusing on hedge fund activism analyze.
We also identify 508 campaigns that SharkWatch flags as involving an individual person as an activist. For each of these campaigns, we gather further information by reading through the campaign synopses and, where applicable, the associated 13D and 14A filings. We supplement these information sources by conducting Google searches on the activists and firms. For each individual activist, we obtain information on any existing or prior relationships between the individual and the target firm. We identify 154 unique campaigns that involve founder, former executives or directors, or current directors, whom we collectively term quasi-insiders. 5 well as the percentage of all campaigns for which quasi-insiders are responsible. In many years, these campaigns represent more than 10% of all campaigns. Their frequency has fluctuated over time, with a peak in the run-up to and immediate aftermath of the financial crisis. The percentage of all campaigns that quasi-insiders launch has declined fairly steadily since 2002, though this is attributable in large part to an increase in hedge fund activism campaigns over this period.
We collect information about a firm's 4-digit SIC code industry category from Compustat, and use that information to assign the firm to one of 12 broad Fama-French industries. We also collect financial-statement information from Compustat that we use to construct a number of firm-year financial variables. We collect daily firm-level stock return data from CRSP.
We collect data on a number of characteristics of the campaigns, activists, and targeted (as well as untargeted) firms. Campaign announcement dates are taken from Factset. 78% of activist campaigns in our sample begin with a 13D filing, which is when the activist group discloses that it has acquired a stake exceeding 5% with active intent. The existing literature has focused on market reactions around 13D filing dates (e.g. Brav et al. (2008) ; von Lilienfeld-Toal and Schnitzler (2015)). The announcement date recorded for the campaign represents the date on which the activist takes a publicly-disclosed action to commence the campaign, and coincides with the 13D filing date for 47% of the campaigns (26% for quasi-insider activists and 52% for hedge funds). We focus on the announcement date because that is when information about the specific objectives of the activist is typically revealed. In addition, initial 13-D filings are frequently much earlier for quasi-insiders for legal reasons due to their prior relationship with the firm.
From FactSet, we collect information about campaign types, tactics, and duration as well as activist ownership at the time of the campaign. We also assign each campaign to one or, at most, two of 12 narrowly-defined categories, nested into five broader super-categories, based on the stated objective(s) of the activist. To do so, we have a research assistant locate and read FactSet's campaign synopsis, SEC proxy and 13D filings, and press releases matching the FactSet announcement date for the campaign and assess the activist's objective(s). The 12 narrow objective categories are similar to those defined in prior papers (e.g., Brav et al. (2008) ).
For each activist target, we obtain accounting data for the campaign target firms from Compustat, return data from CRSP, and institutional ownership 13F data from Thomson Reuters. We correct for known errors in the holdings data. 6 All variables we use are described in Appendix A.
Activist, target firm, and campaign characteristics
This section summarizes the sample based on characteristics of the activist, target firm, and campaign. The analysis in this section is primarily descriptive. However, we discuss possible interpretations of the role and mode of quasi-insider activists as well as how these differ from those of hedge fund activists.
Quasi-insider and target firm characteristics
We begin by describing the relationships that quasi-insiders involved in activism campaigns have with the firms they target. Table 1 summarizes these relationships. Note that these categories are not-mutually exclusivesome individuals fit in multiple categories. Note also that some campaigns include multiple quasi-insiders. Thus, the total number of quasi-insider relationships in campaigns exceeds the total number of campaigns. A former CEO of the target company is involved in initiating 46.1% of these campaigns -the most common quasi-insider relationship. Approximately 1/3 of campaigns involve a founder who is no longer employed by the firm. These campaigns also frequently involve former and current directors.
-Insert Table 1 here -We next describe the firms in our sample. Table 2 reports the breakdown of firms that quasi-insiders and hedge funds target as well as non-targeted firms into 12 Fama-French industry categories. Both quasi-insider and hedge fund activists are disproportionately likely to target companies in the Business Equipment category.
Quasi-insiders are more likely to target companies in the Health industry and less likely to target firms in the Manufacturing and Shops categories than hedge funds. However, like hedge funds, quasi-insiders target firms across a broad swath of sectors.
-Insert Table 2 here - Table 3 reports summary statistics for quasi-insider activist targets (Panel A) and hedge fund activist targets (Panel B) for the year prior to the campaign. Each panel also reports the same statistics for all firm-years for which firms are not subject to activism campaigns for comparison. Asterisks in the "Other Compustat Firms" columns in each Panel indicate statistically significant differences between the targets summarized in that panel and non-targeted firms. Asterisks in the "Hedge Fund Activist Targets" columns in Panel B indicate statistically significant differences between quasi-insider and hedge fund targets.
-Insert Table 3 here -Several differences are worth noting. First, while hedge fund targets are, on average, about the same size as non-targeted firms, the median quasi-insider target is less than 1/3 of the size of the median size for each of these groups. This difference suggests that quasi-insiders play a governance role in a different set of firms than hedge fund activists do and rely on a different economic model to generate returns on their investment. Hedge funds tend to target relatively large firms, where they can acquire large positions (in dollar terms) without generating excessive price pressure. Quasi-insiders often already hold substantial stakes in small firms as a result of their prior relationships. Moreover, if their insider knowledge and connections allow them to engage in activism at a lower cost, they can generate sufficient returns to cover their costs with small holdings (in dollar terms). It is not surprising, then, that quasi-insiders tend to hold larger percentage stakes but that their median dollar stake is less than half the size of the median hedge fund activist dollar stake.
Second, while both quasi-insiders and hedge funds tend to target firms with poor recent performance in terms of ROA and stock return relative to other firms, quasi-insider targets tend to have suffered especially poor recent performance on these dimensions. One interpretation of this difference is that fixed costs of intervention make intervening in small firms more costly than in large firms. Thus, even though quasi-insiders plausibly have a lower cost of intervening, holding firm size fixed, they wait until performance has deteriorated more before intervening.
Third, while hedge fund activists tend to target firms with high levels of institutional ownership relative to other firms, quasi-insiders do not. Existing research suggests that hedge funds prefer to target firms with high levels of institutional ownership because they rely on the support of these institutional owners to support their campaigns (Brav et al. (2008) ). Because of their inside connections, quasi-insiders may not need to rely as much on institutional investor support to achieve their objectives. Alternatively, institutional investors' mandates may prevent them from investing in the types of smaller firms that quasi-insiders target.
Of course, Table 3 only allows for comparisons of quasi-insider targets, hedge fund targets, and other firms on one characteristic at a time. Many of these characteristics are correlated. Thus, to draw conclusions about the nature of firms that quasi-insiders tend to target and how these differ from hedge fund targets, we next turn to multivariate regression analysis. To do so, we estimate probit regressions, where the dependent variable is equal to one if the firm was targeted by an activist in a given year and zero otherwise. We omit some potential explanatory variables from these regressions, as overlap with some of the included regressors would make interpretation difficult.
We make three pairwise comparisons: (i) quasi-insider targets and untargeted firms, (ii) hedge fund targets and untargeted firms, and (iii) quasi-insider and hedge fund targets. To do so, we estimates probit models for three different samples. We form the first by pooling together all firms targeted by quasi-insiders, measuring characteristics the year prior to the campaign, with all firm-years of all firms not targeted during the sample period. We form the second by pooling together all firms targeted by hedge funds, measuring characteristics the year prior to the campaign, with all firm-years of all firms not targeted during the sample period. We form the third by pooling together all quasi-insider and hedge fund targets, again measuring characteristics the year prior to the campaign. Table 4 reports the marginal effects from the probit regressions.
-Insert Table 4 here -We present two separate sets of estimates for each of the three subsamples -one where the explanatory variables are financial characteristics computed using Compustat and one where we add stock returns over the previous year to that set. 7 Models (1) and (4) present these estimates for the pooled quasi-insider target and untargeted firm sample, models (2) and (5) for the pooled hedge fund target and untargeted firm sample, and models (3) and (6) for the pooled hedge fund target and untargeted firm sample.
Consistent with the univariate comparisons in Table 3 , firms targeted by quasi-insiders have lower stock returns than both hedge-fund targets and untargeted firms. They also have lower ROA than hedge-fund targets. They also tend to be smaller than both hedge-fund targets and untargeted firms, as in Table 3 . The coefficient on Log(Market Cap) when we pool quasi-insider and hedge fund targets loses statistical significance when we add stock returns as an explanatory variable. However, note that mean size as reported in Table 3 does not actually differ substantially across the two groups; only the median does.
Activist campaign characteristics
Finally, we summarize the characteristics of the campaigns themselves. Table 5 reports separate breakdowns of quasi-insider and hedge fund campaigns by objective category and super-category.
-Insert Table 5 here -This table reveals that, relative to hedge funds, quasi-insiders are more likely to seek increased control when they launch activism campaigns. They seek full board control in 30.5% of the campaigns they initiate, while hedge funds seek full board control only 7.7% of the time. Quasi-insiders seek at least some board representation 65.6% of the time, compared to 39.8% of the time for hedge funds. They seek to force sales to third parties or a restructuring of the business less frequently. They also seek governance and executive compensation changes and the removal of the CEO or Board Chair more frequently than hedge funds do, though these objectives are relatively uncommon in general. Table 6 reports the frequency of different campaign types and tactics. The breakdown of campaign types in Panel A indicates that quasi-insider campaigns are much more likely than hedge fund campaigns to take the form of full-blown proxy fights (61.1% of campaigns for quasi-insiders, vs. 26.6% for hedge funds). Activists often initiate full-blown proxy fights in campaigns where they seek board representation. While proxy fights do not always coincide with efforts to gain board representation, the prevalence of proxy fights in quasi-insider campaigns is not surprising given the results in Table 5 .
-Insert Table 6 here -Panel B reports the frequency of various campaign tactics. Again, quasi-insiders are much more likely to nominate a slate of directors to the target's board. They also employ other aggressive actions in campaigns more frequently than hedge funds do. For example, they file lawsuits in 14.3% of campaigns, compared to 5.8% for hedge funds, and they lobby shareholders directly via letter 46.1% of the time, compared to 15.3% of the time for hedge funds.
Overall, the results in this section suggest a unique role for quasi-insiders as governance providers. They tend to target smaller firms that traditional hedge fund activists are more likely to ignore. These firms tend to be performing much more poorly when they are targeted. The mode of activism employed by quasi-insider also appears to differ notably from that of hedge fund activists. Quasi-insiders tend to seek greater control and employ more aggressive tactics. One natural interpretation of these differences is that quasi-insiders are better informed about the strategies, operations, and other features of their targets because of their history with these firms. They may therefore at least view themselves as being better positioned to exert direct control over their targets rather than simply inducing one-time changes. Whether they truly are is an empirical question -one that the next section helps to shed light on.
Consequences of quasi-insider activism campaigns
Existing evidence suggests that hedge fund activism campaigns have positive average consequences for shareholders. In this section, we examine the consequences of quasi-insider activism campaigns.
Abnormal Returns and Share Turnover
We begin by examining abnormal returns around the announcements of quasi-insider campaigns and, for comparison, hedge fund campaigns. Figure 2 plots the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as well as the abnormal turnover (see Table A1 for definitions) over the 41 day period centered around the campaign announcement date for quasi-insider and hedge fund campaigns.
-Insert Figure 2 here -Subfigures (a) and (b) plots CARs and abnormal turnover for all quasi-insider and hedge fund campaign announcements, respectively, in our sample. These graphs indicate that both quasi-insider and hedge fund targets exhibit large CARs over the 41 days around the announcement date, with most of the returns concentrated in the few days around the campaign. Both groups of target firms exhibit some run-up prior to the filing date. The hedge fund activism CARs appear similar to those that Brav et al. (2008) and Klein and Zur (2009) document. Hedge fund targets have slightly greater abnormal turnover in the days preceding the announcement, consistent with quasi-insider already having a large stake in the firm, while hedge funds may be acquiring shares in anticipation of launching a campaign. Figure 2 present the CARs separately for two groups of campaigns -those involving control-related objectives and those with other objectives -for quasi-insider and hedge fund campaigns, respectively. We classify campaigns where the activism seeks board representation, board control, or a forced sale of the firm to the activist as control-related. Announcements of the two types of campaigns by hedge funds are associated with similar CARs. However, quasi-insider campaigns are associated with somewhat higher CARs when they are control-related than when they are not. In addition, for quasi-insider campaigns only, more of the abnormal return is concentrated within a few days of the campaign announcement for control-related than for other campaigns. While not conclusive, this evidence points towards obtaining control as being especially important to value creation in quasi-insider campaigns. Table 7 presents the information in Figure 2 in tabular form, allowing us to interpret the magnitude of the CARs around campaign announcements and assess their statistical significance. The full (-20,+20)-window CAR for quasi-insider campaigns is 4.2% and differs statistically from zero with 96% confidence based on a two-tailed t-test. The (-20,+20)-window CAR for hedge fund campaigns is larger at 6.2%.
Subfigures (c) and (d) of
-Insert Table 7 here -To further understand how quasi-insider campaigns might create shareholder value, we also examine the crosssectional determinants of campaign announcement CARs using multivariate analysis. Table 8 reports the results from OLS regressions with the dependent variable equal to the CARs in the (-1,+5) and (-10,+10) windows around the campaign announcement in Panels A and B, respectively.
-Insert Table 8 here -
Columns (1) and (2) (2) and (4) present estimates for proxy contests only. For quasi-insider campaigns, we find little evidence that announcement returns are related to the objective of the campaign, though the small sample size makes it difficult to conclude that there are no relationships. We also find little relationship between announcement returns and campaign objectives for hedge fund campaigns. The strongest conclusion we can draw is that the CARs are increasing with the activist's ownership stake. Figure 2 and Table 7 suggest that, as with hedge fund campaigns, investors perceive quasi-insider campaigns to create value for shareholders. If this perception is correct, then we should observe changes after activism campaigns that ultimately increase cash flow to shareholders. We next investigate the nature of changes in operating performance after activism campaigns by analyzing the evolution of return-on-assets (ROA) around these campaigns. Figure 3 presents this analysis.
Operating Performance
-Insert Figure 3 here -Subfigure (a) plots trends in industry-adjusted ROA -ROA minus mean ROA for the 4-digit SIC code industry in the same year -from three years before to three years after campaigns. 8 While there are no clear patterns for hedge fund campaigns, industry-adjusted ROA falls sharply from three years before a quasi-insider campaign to the year of the campaign before increasing substantially after the campaign. This reversal could indicate that quasi-insider campaigns arrest and reverse declines in operating performance, a potentially important source of value-creation. However, the decline in industry-adjusted ROA before quasi-insider campaigns raises the concern that the subsequent improvement in ROA could simply reflect mean reversion in performance or the effects of survivorship bias.
We address this concern by constructing a control sample of firms with similar declines in performance over the same time window. Specifically, for each quasi-insider targeted firm, we create a subsample consisting of all untargeted firms in the same 2-digit SIC code industry with total assets that are between 50% and 200% of the targeted firm as of the year it is targeted. We then select the untargeted firm within that subsample with the closest change in ROA from three years before the campaign to the year of the campaign as a control. We pool together these control firms to form a control sample with a similar trend in pre-campaign ROA by construction.
We use the same approach to construct a control sample for hedge fund activism campaigns. Figure 3 plots ROA (not industry-adjusted) for quasi-insider and hedge fund campaign targets as well as their respective control samples for the three years before to three years after campaigns. For the hedge fund campaign targets, there are no clear trends for either targeted or control firms. Both quasi-insider targets and their controls exhibit a decline in ROA leading up to campaigns. However, while there is a pronounced reversal in the decline for quasi-insider targets after campaigns, such a reversal is not apparent in the control sample.
Subfigure (b) of
While we cannot rule out mean reversion or survivorship bias attributing to the reversal for quasi-insiders, such distorting influences would have to be absent in control firms experiencing similar declines in ROA pre-campaign. For completeness, subfigure (d) shows depicts the same trends for hedge fund campaigns. We see some evidence here of ROA improvements after control-related hedge fund campaigns, but the magnitude of this change appears small.
Other operating and financial margins
We also examine how other operating margins evolve around quasi-insider and hedge fund activist campaigns. -Insert Figure 4 here -Subfigure (a) depicts the most noteworthy pattern. Not only does ROA decline in the three years before quasiinsider campaigns, but so does sales growth. As with ROA, this decline appears to be reversed after quasi-insider campaigns. Such a reversal of sales growth declines is not apparent for hedge fund targets. Subfigure (b) indicates an increase in payouts relative to the campaign year after both quasi-insider and hedge fund campaigns, though there are no obvious pre-campaign trends here, and post-campaign payouts are similar to pre-campaign payouts.
Subfigure (c) shows a downward trend in industry-adjusted capital expenditures, starting from high levels relative
to industry peers, that continues through the year of the activism campaign.
Campaign Success
Finally, we examine the success rates of quasi-insider and other activist campaigns in meeting their stated campaign goals and compare these rates to those of hedge fund activists. To measure campaign success, we read through the campaign notes provided by FactSet and supplement the information from this source with news articles about the outcome of the campaign. We classify a campaign as successful if the firm implemented at least one of the activists' stated objectives. Table 9 summarizes the success rates of hedge fund and quasi-insider activist campaigns and breaks this down by the category of the campaign objectives.
-Insert Table 9 here -Overall, activists in general are more successful in obtaining board representation or control and less successful in campaigns with a general value objective. Quasi-insiders are successful in achieving at least one of their objectives in 48.1% of their campaigns, somewhat lower than the 53.3% success rate of hedge funds in their campaigns, though the difference is not statistically significance. This difference does not simply reflect the fact that quasi-insiders have more aggressive objectives. Analysis of success rate by objective category shows that quasi-insiders are less successful in four of the five objective categories, though the difference is only statistically significant for campaigns where the activist seeks board control.
There are several possible explanations for quasi-insiders' relative lack of success in their campaigns. Even within categories, the objectives of quasi-insiders campaigns could be bolder than those of hedge fund campaigns, making it more difficult for quasi-insiders to win shareholder support. Alternatively, a lack of institutional investor ownership may make it difficult to win the support of shareholders more broadly. Still another possibility is that campaigns initiated by quasi-insiders are sometimes motivated by personal benefits rather than the opportunity to increase firm value, which could make it difficult to win shareholder support.
We extend this analysis to a multivariate setting to further examine how campaign success varies between hedge fund and quasi-insider activists. We estimate a series of campaign-level probit regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one for successful campaigns and zero for unsuccessful campaigns. Table 10 presents the marginal effects from the estimates of these regressions.
-Insert Table 10 for proxy contests only. We include as explanatory variables the campaign objective as well as log market cap and dissident ownership percentage. The omitted objective category is "general value," so all marginal effects reported for each of the objectives should be interpreted as reflecting success rate for that objective relative to campaigns with a general value objective.
The positive marginal effects indicate that quasi-insiders are more successful at achieving all other objectives relative to general value maximization. However, none of these marginal effects is statistically significant. The small sample size likely results in little statistical power to distinguish quasi-insiders' success rates across different objective categories. We do find that quasi-insider campaign success rate declines with firm size, adding further evidence that the main role of quasi-insiders is to provide governance for relatively small firms. Possibly because of the larger sample size, we find at least some evidence that hedge funds are more successful in achieving objectives other than general value maximization. In contrast, hedge fund campaigns tend to be more successful at achieving objectives in larger firms.
Conclusion
We document that quasi-inside investors employ tactics similar to those used by other activist investors to bring about changes in firm policies. Because hedge fund activism is a widely discussed and studied form of activism, we contrast the activities of quasi-insider activists with hedge fund activists. Quasi-insider activists are more likely to seek to strengthen their influence over the firms and employ more aggressive tactics in order to accomplish this. This suggests that insiders play an active role in corporate governance, though in doing so, they are less successful than hedge fund activists in meeting their stated objectives. However,quasi-insider activists play a potentially complementary role to hedge fund activists because they target different types of firms and are associated with improvements in value and performance.
Like other activists, quasi-insider activists are likely to first attempt to achieve their goals through less confrontational and less costly means in private. The governance efforts that we observe in the form of quasi-insider activist campaigns are therefore likely to represent a possible minority of instances where such efforts have failed and then spilled over into the public domain, a tip of a large iceberg. Our study is thus likely to underestimate the true extent of quasi-insider-led governance efforts and further research is needed to understand what takes place in the private domain. 
Appendices A Variable Definitions *

Variable Definition
Abnormal Turnover Daily turnover is calculated as daily trading volume divided by shares outstanding. Abnormal daily turnover in the event period is measured relative to the average daily turnover for that firm during the (-100,-40) period relative to the event date (Source: CRSP).
CAPEX
The target firm's capital expenditures divided by total assets (Source: Compustat).
CAR(-i,+j)
The cumulative abnormal return from day -i to day +j relative to the campaign announcement computed using event study methodology with the market model (Source: CRSP).
Cash
The target firm's cash and short-term investments divided by total assets (Source: Compustat).
Debt
The sum of the target firm's long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets (Source: Compustat).
Dissident (Dollar) Ownership
The fraction (dollar value in millions) of the target company's shares collectively owned by all the activists involved at the time that the campaign was announced (Source: Factset).
Dividend Yield
The sum of the target firm's common and preferred dividends divided by the sum of the market value of common equity and preferred equity (Source: Compustat).
Institutional Ownership
The percent of shares held by institutions that file with a 13-F (Source: Thompson Reuters).
(Log) Market Cap The (natural log of) market capitalization in millions of dollars of the target firm at the end of the fiscal year before the campaign (Source: Compustat).
Payout
The target firm's total dividends divided by income before extraordinary items (Source: Compustat).
R&D
The target firm's research and development expenses divided by total assets; set equal to zero when missing (Source: Compustat).
ROA
The target firm's net income divided by total assets, return-on-assets (Source: Compustat).
Sales Growth
The change in the target firm's sales between year t and year t-1 divided by sales in year t-1 (Source: Compustat).
Stock Return
The buy-and-hold return in the year prior to the campaign announcement in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index return, computed using monthly return data (Source: CRSP).
Figure 1: Activism Frequency
This graph plots the frequency of activist campaigns over the period 2000 to 2015. The sample consists of activist campaigns obtained from FactSet SharkWatch initiated by either a hedge fund or a quasi-insider, which we define as an individual investor who is a former officer, employee, or director, or a current non-executive director of the firm (see Table 1 ). The sample is restricted to campaigns for which data on target firm characteristics are available in Compustat in the fiscal year prior to the campaign, resulting in 154 quasi-insider activist and 1962 hedge fund activist campaigns. Panel A reports hedge fund activism frequency by year for activist campaigns as reported by Factset. Panel B reports activism frequency by year for quasi-insider activists. The orange line indicates the fraction of activist campaigns that are launched by quasi-insider activists each year.
(a) All Activist Campaigns (b) Quasi-Insider Activist Campaigns This figure plots the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and abnormal turnover around the announcement date for hedge fund and quasi-insider activist campaigns, starting 20 days before and ending 20 days after the announcement date. The sample consists of firms that are targets of activist campaigns obtained from FactSet SharkWatch for the period 2000-2015 initiated by either a hedge fund or a quasi-insider, which we define as an individual investor who is a former officer, employee, or director, or a current non-executive director of the firm (see Table 1 ). The sample is restricted to campaigns for which data on target firm characteristics are available in Compustat in the fiscal year prior to the campaign. The sample is further restricted to firms for which data are available on returns/turnover in CRSP (see Table A1 for definitions), resulting in 118/109 quasi-insider activist and 1787/1499 hedge fund activist campaigns. CARs and abnormal turnover are winsorized at the 5 th and 95 th percentiles each day relative to the announcement. Figure (a) plots the data for quasi-insider campaigns and (b) plots data for hedge fund campaigns. Figures (c) and (d) plot the CARs separately by the type of campaign objective for quasi-insider and hedge fund activist campaigns. Campaign objectives are classified by hand using information from FactSet campaign synopses and SEC 13D and proxy filings (see Table 5 ). Control related campaigns consist of those with the objectives of obtaining board representation, board control, or seeking the sale of the target firm to the activist. Other objective consists of all other objectives. This figure plots the average Return-on-Assets (ROA) around the hedge fund and quasi-insider activist campaigns, starting 3 years before and ending 3 years after the fiscal year during which the campaign was announced. The sample consists of firms that are targets of activist campaigns obtained from FactSet SharkWatch for the period 2000-2015 initiated by either a hedge fund or a quasi-insider, which we define as an individual investor who is a former officer, employee, or director, or a current non-executive director of the firm (see Table 1 ). The sample is restricted to campaigns for which data on target firm characteristics are available in Compustat in the fiscal year prior to the campaign. The sample is further restricted to firms for which data on ROA is available every year for the period starting 3 years before and ending 3 years after the fiscal year during which the campaign was announced, resulting in 74 quasi-insider and 664 hedge fund activist campaigns. ROA is computed as net income divided by total assets and is adjusted annually by the median ROA of firms in the same 4-digit SIC industry and winsorized at the 5 th and 95 th percentiles every year. Figure  (b) plots the ROA (not industry-adjusted) for hedge fund and quasi-insider activist targets and a matched sample of firms for each group. Matches are selected as the firms inside the same 2-digit SIC industry within 200% of total assets of the target, that are closest in their change in ROA from years -3 to 0 to the target firms. (b) only includes target firms with a match available. (c) and (d) plot the industry-adjusted ROA separately by the campaign objective for quasi-insider and hedge fund activist campaigns. Campaign objectives are classified by hand using information from FactSet campaign synopses and SEC 13D and proxy filings (see Table 5 ). Control related campaigns consist of those with the objectives of obtaining board representation, board control, or seeking the sale of the target firm to the activist. Other objective consists of all other objectives. This figure plots Sales growth (a), payout (b), CAPEX (c) and debt (d) around the hedge fund and quasi-insider activist campaigns, starting 3 years before and ending 3 years after the fiscal year during which the campaign was announced. The sample consists of firms that are targets of activist campaigns obtained from FactSet SharkWatch for the period 2000-2015 initiated by either a hedge fund or a quasi-insider, which we define as an individual investor who is a former officer, employee, or director, or a current non-executive director of the firm (see Table 1 ). The sample is restricted to campaigns for which data on target firm characteristics are available in Compustat in the fiscal year prior to the campaign. The sample is further restricted to firms for which data on the plotted firm characteristic is available every year for the period starting 3 years before and ending 3 years after the fiscal year during which the campaign was announced ((b) excludes firms with non-positive income before extraordinary items), resulting in 63/61/74/74 quasi-insider and 617/591/654/654 hedge fund activist campaigns in panel (a)/(b)/(c)/(d). All variables are defined in Table A1 and adjusted annually by the median values for firms in the same 4-digit SIC industry and are winsorized at the 5 th and 95 th percentiles every year. This table summarizes the industries to which firms targeted by hedge fund and quasi-insider activists belong, using is the Fama-French 12 industry classification. The sample consists of activist campaigns obtained from FactSet SharkWatch for the period 2000-2015 initiated by either a hedge fund or a quasi-insider, which we define as an individual investor who is a former officer, employee, or director, or a current non-executive director of the firm (see Table 1 ). The sample of activist campaigns is restricted to those for which data on target firm characteristics are available in Compustat in the fiscal year prior to the campaign, resulting in 154 quasi-insider and 1962 hedge fund activist campaigns. Data on the industry composition of the rest of the Compustat universe, excluding activist target firms, is also reported in the last column.
Fama-French industry code (12 industries This table reports summary statistics on characteristics firms targeted by hedge fund and quasi-insider activists. The sample consists of firms that are targets of activist campaigns obtained from FactSet SharkWatch for the period 2000-2015 initiated by either a hedge fund or a quasi-insider, which we define as an individual investor who is a former officer, employee, or director, or a current non-executive director of the firm (see Table 1 ). The sample is restricted to campaigns for which data on target firm characteristics are available in Compustat in the fiscal year prior to the campaign, resulting in 154 quasi-insider and 1962 hedge fund activist campaigns. Panel A contains summary statistics for targets of quasi-insider activists and the sample of Compustat firms excluding targets of quasi-insider or hedge fund activists. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for t-tests (mean) and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (medians) that compare quasi-insider activist targets to the other Compustat firms. Panel B contains summary statistics for targets of hedge fund activists and the sample of Compustat firms excluding targets of quasi-insider or hedge fund activists. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for t-tests (mean) and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (medians) that compare insider activist targets to the hedge fund activist targets (means and medians for hedge fund targets), and that compare hedge fund activist targets to the other Compustat firms (means and medians for other Compustat firms). All variables are defined in Table A1 . This table summarizes the objectives of hedge fund and quasi-insider activist campaigns that we classify by hand. The sample consists of (firms that are targets of) activist campaigns obtained from FactSet SharkWatch for the period 2000-2015 initiated by either a hedge fund or a quasi-insider, which we define as an individual investor who is a former officer, employee, or director, or a current non-executive director of the firm (see Table 1 ). The sample is restricted to campaigns for which data on target firm characteristics are available in Compustat in the fiscal year prior to the campaign, resulting in 154 quasi-insider and 1962 hedge fund activist campaigns. Campaign objectives are classified by hand using information from FactSet campaign synopses and SEC 13D and proxy filings. The first column indicates the category of the objective and the second column indicates the specific objective. These are not mutually exclusive because a campaign can have up two distinct main objectives. Campaigns with more than two main objectives are classified as General Value. This table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns for the (-1,+1) , (-1,+5), (-10,+10), and (-20,+20) windows around the date of campaign announcement (see Table A1 ). The sample consists of firms that are targets of activist campaigns obtained from FactSet SharkWatch for the period 2000-2015 initiated by either a hedge fund or a quasi-insider, which we define as an individual investor who is a former officer, employee, or director, or a current non-executive director of the firm (see Table 1 ). The sample is restricted to campaigns for which data on target firm characteristics are available in Compustat in the fiscal year prior to the campaign. The sample is further restricted to firms for which data are available on returns in CRSP, resulting in 118 quasi-insider and 1787 hedge fund activist campaigns. Mean CARs are reported for all campaigns, and separately for campaigns with control-related objectives and other objectives. Difference between the mean CARs between quasi-insider and hedge fund campaigns are also reported. Campaign objectives are classified by hand using information from FactSet campaign synopses and SEC 13D and proxy filings (see Table 5 ). This table reports coefficients from OLS regressions with the dependent variable equal to the cumulative abnormal return in the (-1,+5) ((-10,+10)) window around the date of campaign announcement in Panel A (B) . The sample consists of firms that are targets of activist campaigns obtained from FactSet SharkWatch for the period 2000-2015 initiated by either a hedge fund or a quasi-insider, which we define as an individual investor who is a former officer, employee, or director, or a current non-executive director of the firm (see Table 1 ). The sample is restricted to campaigns for which data on target firm characteristics are available in Compustat in the fiscal year prior to the campaign. The sample is further restricted to firms for which data are available on returns in CRSP and data on the dissidents ownership is available in Factset, resulting in 113 quasi-insider and 1633 hedge fund activist campaigns. Columns (1) and (2) include only quasi-insider campaigns and (3) and (4) include only hedge fund campaigns. Columns (2) and (4) include proxy fights only (see Table 6 ). Campaign objectives are classified by hand using information from FactSet campaign synopses and SEC 13D and proxy filings (see Table 5 ). All other variables are defined in Table A1 . t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. This table reports data on the success of activist campaigns for hedge fund and quasi-insider activists. The sample consists of activist campaigns obtained from FactSet SharkWatch for the period 2000-2015 initiated by either a hedge fund or a quasi-insider, which we define as an individual investor who is a former officer, employee, or director, or a current non-executive director of the firm (see Table 1 ). The sample is restricted to campaigns for which data on target firm characteristics are available in Compustat in the fiscal year prior to the campaign, resulting in 154 quasi-insider and 1962 hedge fund activist campaigns. A campaign is classified by hand as being successful if the activist achieves at least one of its stated objectives, according to information in the FactSet synopses and press reports. Success rates are reported for all campaigns as well as separately by objective. Campaign objectives are classified by hand using information from FactSet campaign synopses and SEC 13D and proxy filings (see Table 5 ). Success rates are also reported separately for quasi-insiders and hedge funds. Difference is the difference between the success rates for quasi-insider and hedge fund activists. p-values are for t-tests that compare the success rates for quasi-insider and hedge fund campaigns. This table reports marginal effects from probit regressions with the dependent variable equal to one if the campaign was successful and zero otherwise. A campaign is classified by hand as being successful if the activist achieves at least one of its stated objectives, according to information in the FactSet synopses and press reports. The sample consists of (firms that are targets of) activist campaigns obtained from FactSet SharkWatch for the period 2000-2015 initiated by either a hedge fund or a quasi-insider, which we define as an individual investor who is a former officer, employee, or director, or a current non-executive director of the firm (see Table  1 ). The sample is restricted to campaigns for which data on target firm characteristics are available in Compustat in the fiscal year prior to the campaign and data on the dissidents ownership is available in Factset, resulting in 149 quasi-insider and 1948 hedge fund activist campaigns. Columns (1) and (2) include only quasi-insider campaigns and (3) and (4) include only hedge fund campaigns.
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Columns (2) and (4) only include campaigns that were proxy fights (see Table 6 ). Campaign objectives are classified by hand using information from FactSet campaign synopses and SEC 13D and proxy filings. (see Table 5 ). All other variables are defined in Table  A1 . t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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